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Abstract 
 
Belief in conspiracy theories is typically considered irrational, and as a conse-
quence of this, conspiracy theorists––those who dare believe some conspiracy 
theory––have been charged with a variety of epistemic or psychological failings. 
Yet recent philosophical work has challenged the view that belief in conspiracy 
theories should be considered as typically irrational. By performing an intra-group 
analysis of those people we call “conspiracy theorists”, we find that the problem-
atic traits commonly ascribed to the general group of conspiracy theorists turn out 
to be merely a set of stereotypical behaviours and thought patterns associated 
with a purported subset of that group. If we understand that the supposed prob-
lem of belief in conspiracy theories is centred on the beliefs of this purported sub-
set––the conspiracists––then we can reconcile the recent philosophical contribu-
tions to the wider academic debate on the rationality of belief in conspiracy theo-
ries. 
 
Keywords: conspiracy, conspiracies, conspiracy theory, conspiracy theories, con-
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1. Introduction 
When is a conspiracy theorist not a conspiracy theorist? When she is a govern-
ment minister! Or, if that punchline does not work for you, how about: When 
she is a respected member of the press! Or: When she is an academic who writes 
on conspiracy theories! Typically, when we think of conspiracy theorists we do 
not think of people who theorised about the existence of some particular con-
spiracy––and went on to support that theory with evidence––like John Dewey 
(who helped expose the conspiracy behind the Moscow Trials of the 1930s), or 
Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein (who uncovered the conspiracy behind who 
broke in to the Democratic National Committee Headquarters at the Watergate 
office complex in the 1970s). Instead, we think of the advocates and proponents 
of weird and wacky conspiracy theories like David Icke (who believes that 
shape-shifting alien reptiles control the world), or Alex Jones (who believes––
among many things––that FEMA is setting up death camps all over America in 
preparation for a socialist takeover). As their particular views are considered––at 
the very least––strange, and––at worst—irrational, people often come to the 
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conclusion that conspiracy theories are the kind of thing deeply-weird people 
believe. 
Associating conspiracy theories with the noteworthy advocates or propo-
nents of such theories is understandable. Many of these proponents came up, 
or––at the very least––popularised the theories in question. However, it does not 
follow that our views about people like David Icke or Alex Jones tells us much, 
if anything, about the merit of their theories. This approach of characterising be-
lief in conspiracy theories generally because of the faults of certain conspiracy 
theorists, I argue, gets the matter of analysing belief in conspiracy theories back-
to-front. To show this, we will first look at the works of Karl Popper and Rich-
ard Hofstadter, which set the stage for this analysis. The work of these elder 
statesmen will then be contrasted with recent work on the issue in Philosophy, 
which is more sympathetic towards conspiracy theorising. We will then com-
pare the current philosophical project examining belief in conspiracy theories 
with the work coming out from the social sciences, which centres discussion of 
belief in conspiracy theories in terms of conspiracy theorists suffering from a va-
riety of epistemic or psychological vices, which is often put under the label of 
“conspiracist ideation”, or “Conspiracism”. My contention is that we cannot 
use the class of conspiracists as a general reason to be suspicious of conspiracy 
theorising in particular, and that the faults of the conspiracist are––should such 
theorists even exist––overrated. 
 
2. Back to the Beginning: Popper and Hofstadter 
Much of the contemporary discussion of conspiracy theories and conspiracy 
theorists comes out of replies to––or extensions of––the seminal works of Karl 
Popper or Richard Hofstadter. For example, Popper’s (albeit brief) discussion in 
“The open society and its enemies” frames talk of conspiracy theories with re-
spect to the thesis of the “conspiracy theory of society”: conspiracy theorists be-
lieve that history can be explained as the result of successive and successful con-
spiracies. Popper’s argument against the conspiracy theory of society is that as it 
is obvious history is not the result of a succession of conspiracies, conspiracy 
theorists must be wrong. Belief in conspiracy theories turns out to be, by exten-
sion, irrational.1 
Richard Hofstadter––some twenty years later––characterised belief in con-
spiracy theories as being similar to paranoid ideation.2 The “paranoid style”, as 
Hofstadter dubbed it, is an analogy between belief in conspiracy theories––
characterised as the belief that sinister conspiracies are behind everything—and 
classical paranoia. Hofstadter was not making a clinical diagnosis that conspira-
cy theorists are paranoiacs. Rather, our suspicion of conspiracy theories generally 
is justified because of how closely such conspiratorial claims resemble paranoid 
ideation. If paranoiac ideation is irrational, then belief in conspiracy theories will, 
by analogy, be irrational too. 
Both Hofstadter and Popper agree that conspiracies occur. Whenever two 
or more people plot (a conspiracy requires more than just a lone wolf), typically 
in secret towards some end, then we have a prima facie example of conspiratorial 
behaviour. For Popper, then, the issue was one of justification: conspiracy theo-
 
1 Popper 1972: 341-42. 
2 Hofstadter 1965. 
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rists simply ascribe too much causal power to conspirators and their conspira-
cies, and thus do not have good reason to believe conspiracies are the motive 
force in history. Hofstadter’s critique was phrased along folk-psychological lines: 
paranoiacs have a predisposition to think they are being persecuted when they 
are not, and conspiracy theorists see powerful conspiracies against them where 
none exist. 
The central worry captured by Popper and Hofstadter, then––a concern 
which continues to resonate throughout the literature as we will see––is that 
while conspiracies may very well occur, the kind of people who believe in theo-
ries about conspiracies––conspiracy theorists––do not form these beliefs in the 
right way, or for the right reasons. That is to say, the problem with conspiracy 
theories is typically taken to be something to do with the character of the con-
spiracy theorist. But can we really explain away what, if anything, is wrong with 
belief in conspiracy theories simply by appealing to the character flaws of con-
spiracy theorists? 
 
3. Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorists 
The term “conspiracy theory”, at least in academic circles, is often used as a pe-
jorative. Yet when broken down into its constituent parts, the term “conspiracy 
theory” merely suggests some theory about a conspiracy, one which attempts to 
explain the occurrence of some event with reference to a conspiracy as a salient 
cause. This is certainly the position of much recent philosophical work on the 
subject. Philosophers such as Brian L. Keeley,3 Charles Pigden,4 David Coady,5 
Lee Basham,6 and myself7 have all argued for some variation of the following 
definition: 
Conspiracy theory: any explanation of an event which cites the existence of a 
conspiracy as a salient cause. 
According to views which fit this definition, belief in a particular conspiracy 
theory will be rational when the conspiracy theory ends up being in the pool of 
the best, or most plausible, explanatory hypotheses for some event. Views which 
fall under the rubric of this kind of definition tend to share the following two 
features: 
1. They allow us to analyse the different kinds of conspiratorial activity cov-
ered by the term “conspiracy theory”, and 
2. The analysis of this broader class of conspiratorial explanations shows that 
belief in conspiracy theories is explicable––if not outright rational––in a 
range of cases. 
Such a definition also allows ordinary users to escape the linguistic trap of 
saying say “I’m not a conspiracy theorist, but...” since––by this definition––we 
all turn out to be conspiracy theorists of some stripe. As Charles Pigden has 
written (and reiterated in a number of papers): 
 
 
3 Keeley 2007. 
4 Pigden in press. 
5 Coady 2012. 
6 Basham 2011. 
7 Dentith 2016. 
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Every historically and politically literate person believes and is prepared to be-
lieve some conspiracy theories, since both history and the nightly news present 
many conspiracy theories as facts and others as reasonable hypotheses. You 
can’t be a politically or historically literate person unless you think that although 
history and the nightly news may have been distorted, they have not been sys-
tematically faked, that is, that they are reasonably reliable. So every historically 
and politically literate person believes that some of the conspiracies reported by 
history and the nightly news are real, and thus that the corresponding conspiracy 
theories are true. It is therefore a condition of being a politically and historically 
literate person that you accept some conspiracy theories.8 
 
3.1 Particularism About Conspiracy Theories 
The aforementioned philosophers are––in the parlance of Joel Buenting and Ja-
son Taylor––“Particularists”, whose works on these things we call “conspiracy 
theories” critique endemic generalising strategies in the wider academic litera-
ture. According to Buenting and Taylor, we can contrast the particularist posi-
tion with what they call “Generalism”.9 According to the Generalist, conspiracy 
theories can be assessed as a class without needing to first consider the merits of 
particular conspiracy theories. Generalists––by-and-large––take it that conspira-
cy theories are typically examples of irrational beliefs, pointing towards specific, 
and problematic examples of belief in conspiracy theories as emblematic of be-
lief in conspiracy theories as a whole. For example, they claim conspiracy theo-
rists commit basic errors in probabilistic reasoning,10 suffer from crippled epis-
temologies,11 or that there are serious negative social consequences to belief in 
conspiracy theories.12 From this they derive their justification for a prima facie 
suspicion that belief in conspiracy theories is generally irrational. 
Particularists, however, argue that the rationality of any given conspiracy 
theory can only be assessed by considering the evidence for and against particu-
lar conspiracy theories. That is to say, we need to take each and every conspira-
cy theory and judge it on its respective merits. We cannot simply treat it as “an-
other of those weird conspiracy theories”. Particularists will point to a litany of 
recent, and proven conspiratorial activities which had previously been pejora-
tively labelled as “conspiracy theories”: the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964; the 
Ford Pinto Scandal of 1977; the Snowden revelations of 2013; and the 
Volkswagen Emissions Scandal of 2015. Not just that; they will also point to-
wards work by historians which shows that sometimes acting conspiratorially––
but claiming suspicions about said activity are just vapid conspiracy theories––is 
part-and-parcel of our recent history.13 
For the Particularist, then, there is no principled distinction between a con-
spiracy theory and the explanation of a historical event which cites a known 
 
8 Pigden in press. See also David Coady’s concise summation of Pigden’s argument in 
Coady 2012. 
9 Buenting and Taylor 2010. 
10 Brotherton and French 2014. 
11 Sunstein 2009. 
12 Douglas and Jolley 2014. 
13 For example, Kathryn S. Olmsted’s book Real enemies, which covers the secrecy behind 
the US’s entry into the First World War, the ills of the McCarthy Era, and the misrepre-
sentations by authorities in the wake of 9/11 for political point-scoring (Olmsted 2009). 
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conspiracy (such as the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44BCE), since they are 
all examples of explanatory hypotheses which cite conspiracy theories as salient 
causes of some event. The worry that the Particularist is attuned to is that we 
tend to express worries about conspiracy theories generally before we begin to 
even analyse them. That is, the generalist view that conspiracy theories are typi-
cally bunk trumps the realisation we should be assessing such theories––as we 
should any theory––on their evidential merits. 
Particularists do not think that belief in all conspiracy theories is quintes-
sentially rational. Rather, they argue that we cannot dismiss belief in conspiracy 
theories generally just because of the perceived faults of a few conspiracy theo-
ries, or theorists. As David Coady argues, it is a standard tactic to deride specific 
conspiracy theorists, and thus conspiracy theories in general. However, we can-
not claim such theories or theorists are undesirable merely because they are con-
spiracy theories or theorists. Rather, we would need to establish a connection be-
tween being a conspiracy theory or theorist and said undesirable characteris-
tics.14 As such, adopting a prima facie suspicion of conspiracy theories generally 
before assessing the particulars of a given conspiracy theory gets things back-to-
front, which is to say that fronting “theory” with “conspiracy” should not make 
a difference as to how we go about assessing claims about the world. 
Assessing particular conspiracy theories on their merits is no arduous duty, 
and Particularists argue not just that their position is epistemically defensible, 
but the generalist strategy––when considered carefully––is both inconsistent, 
and has a number of unfortunate consequences. For a start, Generalism relies 
upon a naïve understanding of the appeal to authority, as well as the role of offi-
cialness and endorsements in the rival theories to conspiracy theories, a point 
David Coady has stressed.15 For another, Generalists end up looking confused; 
they fail to principally accommodate both the conspiracy theories they take to 
be irrational, and theories which cite conspiracies as salient causes that they 
happen to endorse as warranted; Lee Basham has taken such confusions to task 
in his work.16 There is also the social cost of Generalism, a point Charles Pigden 
has pressed. Pigden argues that we can—and indeed should––expect certain 
segments of the population––such as investigative journalists, public prosecu-
tors, and other officials who deal with the detection of corruption and malfea-
sance––to treat conspiracy theories seriously so we do not (necessarily) have to. 
There is, after all, an ethical case for Particularism, given that if conspiracies are 
occurring, we ought to be investigating them. The fact, then, that journalists, et 
al., typically treat claims of conspiracy with disdain has the unfortunate conse-
quence of making it all the easier for conspirators to get away with their work, 
the consequence of which sometimes is literally getting away with murder.17 18 
Still, it is easy to understand what motivates the various pejorative connota-
tions of both “conspiracy theory” and “conspiracy theorist”. Nearly all of us 
 
14 Coady 2012. 
15 Coady 2007. 
16 Basham 2011. 
17 Basham argues that there are certain stories which are “too toxic” to be reported by the 
media or public officials, which is to say that generalism about conspiracy theories has 
produced a reticence to talk about real conspiracies by the very people we should expect 
to expose them (Basham 2017). 
18 Pidgen 2016. See also his earlier piece, “Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional 
Wisdom Revisited” (Pigden in press). 
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have, at some point, said “I’m not a conspiracy theorist, but ...” whilst advanc-
ing what is clearly a theory about some conspiracy. When we say “I’m not a 
conspiracy theorist, but…” we are, typically, asserting some theory about a con-
spiracy which we happen to think is justified by the available evidence, whilst 
trying to avoid being lumped in with the weird and wacky conspiracy theorists 
of this world. Yet a careful consideration of the term “conspiracy theory” shows 
that this piece of linguistic gymnastics is unnecessary. 
At issue, then, is a distinction between the merits of particular conspiracy 
theories, and the views of particular conspiracy theorists. We worry about being 
compared to certain conspiracy theorists, and so avoid talk of anything that 
could be construed as one of those “perfidious conspiracy theories”. Yet this is 
obviously a problem, because if belief in a particular conspiracy theory is ration-
al according to the evidence, it should not matter who else happens to believe it. 
The problem, then, is one of perception. It is not obvious that belief in par-
ticular conspiracy theories is irrational. Rather, the issue is being considered a 
particular kind of conspiracy theorist, one who seemingly believes in the exist-
ence of conspiracies sans evidence, good reason, or just happens to believe such 
theories as a matter of course. 
 
3.2 Particular Problems with Generalist Positions 
This distinction between talk of the peculiarities of certain conspiracy theorists, 
and the merit of particular conspiracy theories is curiously lacking in much re-
cent work outside of Philosophy. For example, Karen M. Douglas and Robbie 
M. Sutton claim “[I]n the main conspiracy theories are unproven, often rather 
fanciful alternatives to mainstream accounts”,19 and argue that conspiracy theo-
rists are likely to believe conspiracy theories because they are more likely to 
sympathise with conspirators. In a more recent paper, Douglas and Michael J. 
Wood write: “[T]he specifics of a conspiracy theory are less important than its 
identity as a conspiracy and its opposition to the official explanation”.20 Ales-
sandro Bessi, Mauro Coletto, George Alexandru Davidescu, Antonio Scala, 
Guido Caldarelli and Walter Quattrociocchi characterise conspiracy theories as 
“Narratives [which] tend to reduce the complexity of reality and are able to con-
tain the uncertainty they generate”.21 These are all examples of generalist posi-
tions, which take the beliefs or behaviours of some conspiracy theorists as being 
indicative of what belief in conspiracy theories generally entails. 
There are also conspiracy theory theorists who take it that the beliefs or be-
haviours of some conspiracy theorists naturally lead to negative social conse-
quences, and this, then, is a reason to dismiss conspiracy theories generally. For 
example, Stephan Lewandowsky, Klaus Oberauer and Gilles E. Gignac claim 
their “results identify conspiracist ideation as a personality factor or cognitive 
style[.]” which is immune to evidence-based thinking.22 Karen M. Douglas and 
 
19 Douglas and Sutton 2011: 544. 
20 Wood and Douglas 2013: 2. See also Wood, Douglas, and Sutton 2012. 
21 Bessi et al. 2015: 2. 
22 Lewandowsky, Oberauer, and Gignac 2013: 630. In a follow up paper (notably retract-
ed (Retraction Watch 2014)), Stephan Lewandowsky, John Cook, Klaus Oberauer and 
Michael Marriott––‘Recursive fury: conspiracist ideation in the blogosphere in response 
to research on conspiracist ideation’––talk about belief in conspiracy theories as a ‘pro-
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Daniel Jolley define conspiracy theories as “[A]ttempts to explain the ultimate 
causes of events as secret plots by powerful forces rather than as overt activities 
or accidents”.23 Whilst they admit that there might be positive social conse-
quences to belief in such theories (questioning who the appropriate authorities 
are for, what counts as evidence, et cetera) they choose to focus their attention 
on the negative social consequences of belief in conspiracy theories; they effec-
tively analyse conspiracy theories through the lens of pathological belief in con-
spiracy theories, ignoring that this talk about the special character of some con-
spiracy theorists tells us nothing about the merit of their respective conspiracy 
theories. Robert Brotherton and Christopher C. French have sought to explain 
why people believe such theories in terms of the perceived faults of some con-
spiracy theorists, investigating particular biases towards preferring conspiratorial 
explanations.24 Jan-Willem van Prooijen and Michele Acker claim “accumulat-
ing research findings reveal a range of detrimental perceptions and behaviors 
that are associated with conspiracy beliefs, including health problems, decreased 
civic virtue, hostility, and radicalization”.25 
All these analyses of belief in conspiracy theories share the same underlying 
critique that belief in such theories is caused by factors other than arguments 
and evidence. Yet the arguments are presented as a generalist stratagem: if we 
can show that some conspiracy theorists believe in conspiracy theories for factors 
other than arguments and evidence, then that somehow shows that conspiracy 
theories––as a class––are suspect as well. These arguments, then, assume we 
have grounds to be suspicious of the broad class of conspiracy theories before an-
alysing whether the grounds for such a suspicion is itself warranted. 
 
4. A Problem with Some Conspiracy Theorists 
The most charitable reading of the social science literature is something like this: 
“Even if we admit belief in particular conspiracy theories can be warranted, we 
need to respect the notion there exists some kind of pathological belief in such 
theories”. We can call this notion––which describes the supposed pathological 
belief in conspiracy theories––Conspiracism. 
Conspiracism: The view that belief in conspiracy theories is typically due to, or 
caused by, factors other than there being good arguments or 
evidence in favour of such theories. 
The thesis of Conspiracism is at the heart of the aforementioned critiques of 
belief in conspiracy theories by social scientists.26 It is the thesis that we can ex-
plain away belief in conspiracy theories with respect to factors not to do with 
 
pensity to explain a significant political or social event as a secret plot by powerful indi-
viduals or organizations’ (Lewandowsky et al. 2013). 
23 Douglas and Jolley 2014: 35. 
24 Brotherton and French 2014: 238. 
25 Prooijen and Acker 2015: 1. 
26 Conspiracism might be more charitably captured by talk of certain conspiracy theorists 
mistakenly weighing, or taking as salient irrelevant evidence with respect to some con-
spiracy theory. However, the worry expressed by a great many social scientists when they 
engage in conspiracist-like critiques of belief in conspiracy theories is not so charitable. 
The aforementioned critiques typically claim that we can explain away belief in conspir-
acy theories generally with attitudes or predispositions, rather than an analysis of whether 
the conspiracy theory is warranted or unwarranted. 
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whether the conspiracy theory is warranted or unwarranted but, rather, an atti-
tude of believing conspiracy theories without respect to the evidence.27 
People who suffer from Conspiracism are, then, “conspiracists”, and are 
the kind of people we typically think believe conspiracy theories for factors other 
than there being good arguments or evidence in favour of them. A conspiracist 
will always be a conspiracy theorist (since being a conspiracist requires believing 
some conspiracy theory), but not all conspiracy theorists will turn out to be con-
spiracists. Calling someone a “conspiracist” is to add a value judgement to the 
claim they are a conspiracy theorist by also claiming that they have no epistemic 
reason to believe said theory. 
The terms “conspiracism” and “conspiracist”, then, reflect the common, 
pejorative labelling typically associated with conspiracy theories and conspiracy 
theorists, which typically marks out that both the theory and the theorist are 
problematic. Perhaps helpfully (although maybe not) the terms “conspiracist” 
and “conspiracism” are recurrent in the academic literature, which we might be 
able to exploit to make sense of “We are all conspiracy theorists!” and the no-
tion that “But I’m not one of those conspiracy theorists (aka a conspiracist)!” 
Yet, if we are to take the thesis of Conspiracism seriously (which is up for 
debate, as we will see), we must realise that the issue concerns the putative ex-
istence of a certain kind of conspiracy theorists, and not necessarily the theories 
they believe. This is important, because the existing academic literature is large-
ly insensitive to the distinction between the claims of some presumably wacky 
conspiracy theorists, and the larger, more general class of conspiracy theorists (a 
class Pigden rightly points out we all belong to). Let us then explore, then, the 
apparent distinction between conspiracy theorists and conspiracists. 
 
5. Gullible Conspiracist Theorists 
As we saw earlier, critiques of belief in conspiracy theories in conspiracist terms 
can be motivated by the thought such belief has negative social consequences––
loss of trust in authority, potential apathy with respect to contemporary political 
arrangements, and the like––but these consequences may well be rational re-
sponses to evidence that the world is more conspired than some would either 
have us believe or like to think. More troublingly, some of these conspiracist-
style analyses resurrect elements of both Hofstadter’s paranoid style and Popper’s 
conspiracy theory of society, whether or not the authors intend, or are aware of, it. 
However, if we take seriously the work of Particularists like Coady, Basham, 
and Pigden (to name but a few), then such generalist critiques of belief in con-
spiracy theories, especially critiques that posit there are negative consequences 
to such belief, need to be analysed again. 
For example, Jovan Byford presents a Popperian gloss on belief in conspir-
acy theories, arguing that conspiracists wrongly assume that conspiracies are the 
motive force in history.28 Bradley Franks, Adrian Bangerter and Martin W. 
Bauer characterise belief in conspiracy theories as a “quasi-religious mentality”, 
claiming that belief in conspiracy theories is akin to magical thinking and that 
 
27 According to Jack Z. Bratich the term “Conspiracism” became popular in the 1990s, 
and was a response to the folk-psychology of Hofstadter’s paranoid style. Conspiracist-
styled critiques centered discussion about conspiracy theories with respect to political 
ideologies, and what might be considered “dangerous” sentiments (Bratich 2008). 
28 Byford 2011. 
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such “thinking engenders uncompromising fundamentalism that decrease the 
prospects of fruitful inter-group dialog”,29 which has shades of Popper’s analogy 
between belief in conspiracy theories and theistic belief. 
However, it is the presence of Hofstadter’s thesis of the “paranoid style” 
that continues to rear its head in the dissection of belief in conspiracy theories. 
For example, Daniel Pipes characterises people who believe in conspiracy theo-
ries as being paranoiac in nature, and suffering from some “fear of imaginary 
conspiracies”.30 Joseph Roisman claims that “conspiratorial allegations filled a 
psychological need by helping the Athenians to understand and deal with dis-
crepancies between expectations and reality”.31 Michael Barkun argues there is a 
similarity between paranoia and the plots imagined by conspiracy theorists––
echoing Hofstadter––and claims that no matter how evidence-based a conspira-
cy theory might appear to be, “belief in a conspiracy theory ultimately becomes 
a matter of faith rather than proof”.32 Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule claim 
that conspiracy theorists suffer from what they call a “crippled epistemology”, 
which causes such theorists to question what should be considered basic sources 
of knowledge about the world.33 
Sunstein and Vermeule’s idea that conspiracy theorists are somehow crip-
pled in their thinking has been echoed in two pieces by Quassim Cassam, “Bad 
thinkers”34 and “Vice Epistemology”.35 Cassam argues that our suspicion of 
conspiracy theories is justified because conspiracy theorists suffer from epistemic 
vices: intellectual character traits that impede effective and responsible inquiry. 
As Cassam puts it: “Intellectual virtues are cognitive excellences, intellectual 
vices are cognitive defects”.36 Conspiracy theorists––in Cassam’s view––suffer at 
the very least from the epistemic vice of gullibility, and possibly are also cynical 
and prejudiced to boot. 
Cassam’s argument about the gullibility of conspiracy theorists relies on us 
getting to know Oliver, his fictional conspiracy theorist. Oliver just happens to 
be an adherent of the “Inside Job” set of conspiracy theories about the events of 
9/11,37 and he: 
 
spends much of his spare time reading about what he calls the “9/11 conspiracy” 
and he regards himself as something of an expert in the field of 9/11 studies. He 
believes that [P] the 9/11 attacks were not carried out by al-Qaeda and the col-
lapse of the World Trade Center towers on 11 September 2001 was caused by 
explosives planted in the buildings in advance by government agents rather than 
 
29 Franks, Bangerter and Bauer 2013: 10. 
30 Pipes 1997: 26. 
31 Roisman 2006: 160. 
32 Barkun 2003: 7. 
33 Sunstein and Vermeule 2009. Sunstein and Vermeule want to cure conspiracy theorists 
via “[C]ognitive infiltration designed to break up the crippled epistemology of conspira-
cy-minded groups and informationally isolated social networks” (Sunstein and Vermeule 
2009: 227). For a lengthy reply to Sunstein and Vermeule’s prescription, see Kurtis Ha-
gen’s “Is Infiltration of “Extremist Groups” Justified?” (Hagen 2010). 
34 Cassam 2015. 
35 Cassam 2016. 
36 Cassam 2016: 160. 
37 The various “Inside Job” hypotheses claim the U.S. either made it happen on purpose 
(MIHOP), or they let it happen on purpose (LIHOP). Either way, the responsible party was 
the U.S. Government, and the official theory––that Al-Qaeda were behind it––is false. 
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by aircraft impacts and the resulting fires. As far as Oliver is concerned, the col-
lapse of the twin towers was an inside job and specifically the result of a con-
trolled demolition (Cassam 2016: 162). 
 
The way Cassam portrays Oliver is interesting: his fictional conspiracy theorist’s 
belief is not based on arguments or evidence, but merely an insistence that “it 
had to be an inside job ... because aircraft impacts couldn’t have brought down 
the towers”.38 Oliver is one of these perfidious conspiracists! 
Now, Cassam claims his interest is chiefly concerned with conspiracy theo-
ries that are baseless and false, yet he picks as Oliver’s chosen topic a conspiracy 
theory which is not, at first glance, either baseless or false.39 No matter what we 
believe about the plausibility or warrant of the various Inside Job hypotheses, 
even the most cursory examination of 9/11 conspiracy theories will provide you 
with numerous examples of conspiracy theorists who use sophisticated argu-
ments, and interesting pieces of evidence to show up the official theory.40 
The problem is this: it is just not obvious that proponents of such views are 
gullible in the sense Cassam would have us believe. While people like Oliver 
may well exist in the community of people who treat claims about 9/11 being 
an inside job seriously, it is more accurate to say they are––first and foremost––
people who are gullible who––secondly––just happen to be conspiracy theo-
rists.41 It is not clear that Oliver is gullible simply because he is a conspiracy the-
orist; it is just as likely he is a conspiracy theorist who just happens to be gullible. 
This is a problem because Cassam’s argument relies on characterising the ad-
herents of such theories––the general class of 9/11 inside job conspiracy theo-
rists––as being all like his fictional, deliberately conspiracist creation. 
It is not clear, then, that Cassam’s Oliver is a typical 9/11 Inside Job conspir-
acy theorist, let alone a typical conspiracy theorist in general. Then again, Oliver is 
not a real person; Cassam has created him in order to prove a point, going to no 
lengths whatsoever to show that Oliver is a typical of his kind. Whilst Cassam 
cites Oliver as a “concrete example”,42 he later admits his position can be criti-
cised on the grounds that Oliver is “a fictional case and that while it is open to 
me to stipulate that Oliver believes what he believes about 9/11 because of his 
traits of character, nothing follows about the viability of such explanations in the 
real world”.43 Cassam argues his construal of Oliver fits with the research on be-
lief in conspiracy theories coming out of social psychology, yet one cannot help 
but think Cassam is constructing a psychological portrait of Oliver to fit that 
 
38 Cassam 2015. 
39 Indeed, as Simon Locke has argued, even experts disagree on what counts as clearly 
plausible, implausible, baseless, or false when it comes to particular conspiracy theories 
(Locke 2009).  
40 The official theory of the events of 9/11 is also a conspiracy theory, at least with re-
spect to the definition of such theories defended in this paper. It was the result of secre-
tive activity undertaken by a group of plotters, to wit the Al-Qaeda terrorists. 
41 Cassam’s view is a notably retrograde version of Hofstadter “paranoid style”. As Jack 
Z. Bratich has argued, Hofstadter talks about the paranoid style as mimicking rational 
thought (Bratich 2008: 32). However, Cassam presents people like Oliver as not even ad-
vancing arguments for their conspiracy theories, which makes Cassam’s conclusion terri-
bly trivial. 
42 Cassam 2016: 161. 
43 Cassam 2016: 170. 
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work, all in order to bolster his own case. Certainly, claiming “My fictional cre-
ation resembles work in another field” does not, in turn, tell us that his construal 
of an archetypal conspiracy theorist is the best. Indeed, it suggests Cassam simp-
ly shares with the aforementioned social psychologists the same views on those 
“pernicious” conspiracy theorists.44 
Indeed, throughout both papers Cassam uses the existence of the fictional 
Oliver to charge conspiracy theorists as gullible. Of Oliver he says that: 
• “[H]e thinks that 9/11 was an inside job because he is gullible in a certain 
way”. 
• “[H]e is the last person to recognise that he believes what he believes about 
9/11 because he is gullible”. 
• “To describe Oliver as gullible or careless is to say something about his in-
tellectual style or mind-set–for example, about how he goes about trying to 
find out things about events such as 9/11”. 
• “Oliver is gullible because he believes things for which he has no good evi-
dence, and he is closed-minded because he dismisses claims for which there 
is excellent evidence”.45 
Cassam repeatedly characterises Oliver as gullible in order to appeal to our intel-
lectual vanity. We do not believe such theories, so those who do––like Oliver––
must suffer from epistemic vices. Yet Cassam’s argument suffers from two, ob-
vious faults. 
1. The idea conspiracy theorists are, generally, gullible is the product of Cas-
sam’s prejudices about certain conspiracy theorists, rather than something 
which follows from his arguments about belief in conspiracy theories, and 
2. People are just as likely to be sceptical towards conspiracy theories be-
cause conspiracy theory theorists––like Cassam––keep telling them they 
are unwarranted as they are to have investigated said theories for them-
selves (and, presumably, found them generally wanting). 
Cassam ends up using what is, in essence, a rhetorical move in order to get 
to a pre-ordained conclusion. By defining Oliver as a being a particular kind of 
problematic conspiracy theorist––the putative “conspiracist”––Cassam attempts 
to derive the more general claim that belief in conspiracy theories is predicated 
by intellectual vice. However, if this is a vice associated with belief in conspiracy 
theories, it is a vice suffered only by some conspiracy theorists. We are the ones 
who would be gullible––indeed, very gullible––if we believed conspiracy theo-
rists generally suffer from epistemic vices. Cassam’s argument would only stand 
if he restricted his talk of epistemic vices to the set of problematic conspiracy the-
orists. However, if Cassam were only to focus on these putative conspiracists, 
his general argument about the dangers of belief in conspiracy theories would be 
seen for what it is, an overstatement.46 Indeed, Cassam’s strident insistence 
 
44 In early 2015 Cassam described Oliver as someone who researched his 9/11 conspiracy 
theories, (Cassam 2015) but, a year later, anything remotely resembling an epistemic vir-
tue (for example, engaging in research) has been dropped from Oliver’s description; Cas-
sam seemingly has dumbed down his fictional conspiracy theorist in order to support his 
conclusions. 
45 Cassam 2015. 
46 Cassam––like Sunstein and Vermeule––advocates a cure for belief in conspiracy theo-
ries; his prescription is to encourage virtue epistemology in the education system, and 
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about the necessity that the only proper explanation of Oliver’s belief in some 
conspiracy theory about 9/11 is gullibility seems itself to be the product of the 
intellectual character trait of dogmatism, an epistemic vice.47 
 
6. The Problem of Conspiracism 
Recall Pigden’s adage: if we are politically or historically literate, then we are all 
conspiracy theorists of some stripe. So, why then are we so sceptical of conspir-
acy theorists and the theories they believe? Is the generalist position that informs 
arguments for scepticism of conspiracy theories merely motivated by the suspi-
cion that some conspiracy theorists are weird? Are we just mistaking Conspirac-
ism––a thesis that describes a potentially problematic kind of belief in conspira-
cy theories expressed by some conspiracy theorists––with belief in conspiracy 
theories generally? If that is the case, surely such conspiracy theory theorists 
should restrict their talk to this subset of conspiracy theorists––the putative con-
spiracists––who typically believe conspiracy theories for reasons other than argu-
ments and evidence? That is to say, they should adopt a particularist position, and 
talk about the problems of belief for particular conspiracy theorists, rather than 
turning said worries into a scepticism of conspiracy theories generally. 
The problem is that what constitutes talk of conspiracist ideation in the ac-
ademic literature is much too broad; belief in conspiracy theories gets character-
ised by what we have called here “conspiracism”, and so conspiracy theorists 
are taken to be de facto examples of conspiracists. Now, while we might be able 
to single out a sub-set of conspiracy theorists who believe conspiracy theories for 
reasons other than arguments and evidence, the existence of such conspiracy 
theorists––the class of conspiracists––tells us nothing particularly interesting 
about belief in conspiracy theories generally. It is not obvious all conspiracy theo-
rists are conspiracists, let alone that there really are many, if any, conspiracists. 
If we end up assuming belief in conspiracy theories is irrational or patho-
logical because particular conspiracy theorists appear to be irrational, or have 
some psychological predisposition to believe conspiracy theories, then we are 
performing our analysis back-to-front. We should not associate belief in con-
spiracy theories generally with a mere subset of believers in conspiracy theories, 
the putative conspiracists. While there is room for discussion about, say, the 
psychology of certain kinds of conspiracy theorists, we should not let theses 
about a subset of conspiracy theorists intrude on a discussion of conspiracy the-
ories generally.48 
The problem here is this: if we talk about the general class of conspiracy 
theorists as being merely conspiracists, then we end up mistaking potential prob-
lems with belief in particular conspiracy theories by certain conspiracy theorists 
with talk of problems with belief in conspiracy theories generally. As such, wor-
ries about examples of seemingly weird conspiracy theorists––alleged conspirac-
 
teaching students that political piety (a term I borrow from Basham 2011: 55) is an epis-
temic good (Cassam 2015). 
47 For another critique of Cassam, see Pigden 2016. 
48 Peter Knight argues that critiques of belief in conspiracy theories in conspiracist terms 
seem to suffer from the faults of Conspiracism itself, as Conspiracism ends up not just 
being an ideology conspiracists suffer from, but a “mysterious force with a hidden agenda 
that takes over individual minds and even whole societies” (Knight 2000: 7). 
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ists like Icke and Jones (or even Cassam’s fictional “Oliver”)––tell us little about 
the merits, or lack thereof, of their conspiracy theories. 
There are two issues at stake here, and unrestricted talk about belief in con-
spiracy theories as conspiracist in nature confuses the matter. The first issue is 
the question of when is belief in a particular conspiracy theory warranted or 
unwarranted? The second issue is whether some conspiracy theorists believe con-
spiracy theories regardless of the evidence? Focussing solely on the second issue 
without considering the first is––it seems––a curious fault of many a conspiracy 
theory theorist. 
This, then, is evidence of a curious double-standard in the literature when it 
comes to talk about conspiracy theories. For example, it would be silly to tar the 
thesis of atheism with the facile arguments of certain atheists, who might have 
been merely socially conditioned to be atheists, or turn out to have certain psy-
chological attitudes which makes them think that god (or the gods) do not exist. 
After all, the truth or falsity of the thesis of atheism is a fact independent of what 
we believe about the world. Either there are gods, or there are not. What makes 
atheism a rational or reasonable belief for individuals to hold depends on both 
the available evidence and arguments, rather than the views of actual atheists. 
Yes, there are what we might call “unreflective atheists”—whose atheism is, 
say, political rather than epistemic—yet this should not count against the thesis 
of atheism. In the same way, what makes a conspiracy theory a reasonable be-
lief for someone to hold depends on the arguments and evidence the conspiracy 
theorist is able to produce. We should not just dismiss questions about the merit 
of some conspiracy theory merely because of the existence of conspiracists. 
 
7. Stipulating Conspiracism 
So, how seriously should we take the thesis of Conspiracism? Certainly, it de-
scribes a potential kind of pathological belief in conspiracy theories, but “poten-
tial” is the operative term here. It would be a mistake to assume there is some-
thing special about the possibility that some belief in conspiracy theories is pred-
icated on factors other than arguments and evidence. As we saw with the exam-
ple of the unreflective atheist, people sometimes just believe things without ade-
quate justification. The question, surely, is why would we hold people to a high-
er standard when it comes to belief in conspiracy theories than we do the hold-
ers of other views, or theories? 
For example, it is possible to be a conspiracist about perfectly legitimate, 
and warranted conspiracy theories. Perhaps you irrationally hate Messrs. Blair 
and Bush, and thus adopt the view that the stated reason for the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003––to stop the manufacture of Weapons of Mass Destruction––was the 
product of a disinformation campaign. You would be right, but if your only rea-
son to endorse this particular conspiracy theory was irrational hatred (and not 
actual evidence) your belief looks conspiracist in nature, rather than the product 
of healthy conspiracy theorising. 
As such, one potential objection to this talk of Conspiracism is that most of 
us turn out to be conspiracists of some sort. We might think there are two prob-
lems here: 
Problem one: If we define a conspiracist as “someone who believes a conspir-
acy theory for factors other than there being good arguments or 
evidence”, then it might turn out we are all conspiracists. 
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Most psychologists and philosophers are happy to endorse some version of the 
following proposition: a great many (if not all) of us hold one belief that we 
think is true, but for which we lack justification. Justifying our beliefs can be dif-
ficult, and many of us believe a number of things that, if challenged, turn out to 
be unjustified. 
For example, a friend keeps telling me that the Gulf of Tonkin incident is a 
real example of a false flag operation (and thus a conspiracy). I trust them, be-
cause they seem like an authoritative source. However, it is quite possible I do 
not have sufficient justification to trust my friend on this; maybe he has a long 
history of lying, and even goes so far to create or edit web pages to provide “evi-
dence” for his theories. My belief that the Gulf of Tonkin incident is a false flag 
may well be one that makes me a conspiracist because I believe the conspiracy 
theory despite a lack of adequate justification. 
Note that this particular problem has an interesting corollary: I can be a 
conspiracist with respect to one conspiracy theory, and be a perfectly normal 
conspiracy theorist with respect to some other. If we add to this analysis the idea 
we are all conspiracy theorists of some stripe (à la Pigden), then it seems proba-
ble (but not necessary) many of us are also conspiracists about at least one con-
spiracy theory that we believe. 
Problem two: If we define a conspiracist as “someone who believes a conspiracy 
theory for factors other than there being good arguments or evi-
dence”, then it might turn out there aren’t many conspiracists. 
A common refrain when discussing conspiracy theories is the claim people be-
lieve them for any old reason. However, even a cursory analysis of what con-
spiracy theorists actually say in support of their theories indicates that they often 
have quite well-developed arguments for their theories. Richard Gage––a prom-
inent advocate of one of the 9/11 Inside Job hypotheses––has detailed, even so-
phisticated arguments pertaining to the hypothesis that the Twin Towers were 
destroyed by a controlled demolition. We might, on close inspection, find fault 
in his reasoning, but his arguments are not baseless or false in any obvious 
sense.  
As such, one worry about how talk of Conspiracism is being framed here is 
that many of the conspiracy theorists people might take to be quintessential con-
spiracists just turn out, on closer inspection, to be normal conspiracy theorists. If 
their theories are unwarranted, then it is because the arguments in favour of 
them suffer from problems of validity or soundness in a non-trivial (i.e. not im-
mediately obvious) sense. 
Problem one describes what we might deem a specific problem: depending 
on the conspiracy theory I might turn out to be a conspiracist in one case, and a 
conspiracy theorist in another. Problem two describes a general problem: as de-
fined, there might not be many, if any, conspiracists. Yet both are bullets we 
need to bite; it may turn out that there are not that many conspiracists, or if con-
spiracists exist, most of us will turn out to be one. As long as we are aware of 
these issues, we can proceed to analyse belief in conspiracy theories, and ask 
whether Conspiracism is something we need to take into account when analys-
ing the beliefs of individual conspiracy theorists and their particular conspiracy 
theories. 
After all, despite what doubts we might have about construing belief in 
conspiracy theories generally in conspiracist terms, it may still be useful to study 
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Conspiracism and putative conspiracists, given that such a study may well ex-
plain particular cases of weird belief in conspiracy theories. Working out why 
some conspiracy theorists––the putative conspiracists––might believe conspiracy 
theories for factors other than evidence and arguments could be informative. 
This would especially be the case if we could then link the explanation of con-
spiracist beliefs to cases where people also believe other theories for factors other 
than evidence and arguments. 
It might also be the case that once we investigate Conspiracism, it will turn 
out to be a fairly useless thesis, especially if there are not many (if any) actual 
conspiracists. However, if we are going to treat the thesis of Conspiracism seri-
ously—and investigate it––we need to keep in mind that conspiracists are simply 
one kind of conspiracy theorist. The putative existence of such conspiracists 
does not tell us that belief in conspiracy theories generally is problematic. The 
question should be “When, if ever, is a conspiracy theorist a conspiracist?” rather 
than presupposing that conspiracy theorists suffer from conspiracist ideation. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Conspiracy theorists––like most people––typically form their beliefs on the basis 
of the arguments and evidence available to them. Whilst there are some cases of 
seemingly irrational, or even pathological belief in conspiracy theories, the exist-
ing academic literature is often insensitive to the distinction between claims 
about the problems of certain conspiracy theorists, and claims about the rational-
ity of belief in conspiracy theories generally. This has resulted in the masking of 
a sly shift of the burden of proof from conspiracy theory theorists on to the pejo-
ratively labelled “conspiracy theorists”: rather than requiring conspiracy theory 
theorists to support their assertion that belief in conspiracy theories is––in fact––
suspicious, talk of Conspiracism effectively requires conspiracy theorists to say 
“But, I’m not a conspiracy theorist!” in order to avoid being charged with acting 
irrationally, or suffering from some psychological defect. 
We can avoid this unfortunate situation if we recognise that the problem––
if indeed it is a problem––is merely found in a subset of conspiracy theorists, the 
so-called “conspiracists”. We would then be able to accommodate the con-
spiracist-style literature of much of the social sciences, without automatically 
buying into a pejorative gloss on belief in conspiracy theories generally. 
My argument, then, provides additional support for Particularism with re-
spect to conspiracy theories. By diagnosing what is really happening with much 
work in the social sciences, which mistakes Conspiracism––a thesis about some 
conspiracy theorists––for belief in conspiracy theories generally, we can show 
why Particularism about conspiracy theories is preferable. So, if someone alleg-
es a conspiracy has occurred, we should examine the evidence for that conspira-
cy theory. Conspiracy theories are not the problem; conspiracism might be, espe-
cially if we end up construing belief in conspiracy theories solely in terms of the 
conspiracists.49 
 
 
49 Thanks to Brian L. Keeley, Edmund King, Justine Kingsbury, Lee Basham, Martin 
Orr, Richard G Ellefritz, Tiddy Smith, and Victoria Cockle for feedback on earlier ver-
sions of this paper. 
Matthew R. X. Dentith was supported by a fellowship at the Research Institute of the 
University of Bucharest (ICUB). 
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